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Franck Charles Arif v Republic of Moldova: Courts Behaving Nicely and What to Do 
about It1  
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The 2013 Award of the ICSID Tribunal in the case of Frank Charles Arif v Republic of Moldova is 
noteworthy for squarely addressing an important point of international investment law: how to 
deal with courts behaving nicely?2 Or, to put it in more technical terms, how should investment 
Tribunals approach claims about conduct of domestic courts that, while unobjectionable on its 
own terms, has the effect of harming the investment by diverging from a position taken by other 
public authorities in their dealings with the investor? Reasonable people may disagree on whether 
the Tribunal’s answer -- that a State may incur international responsibility for the breach of fair 
and equitable treatment because of legitimate expectations by investors to consistent behaviour 
by public authorities – is the best possible one. Still, the Tribunal is to be commended for posing 
the right questions in an explicit manner, which should hopefully contribute to development of 
law on the issue (whether jurisprudence constante is eventually formed on the basis of the rationale 
of Arif or on its rejection).3  
         
II. BACKGROUND  
 
Frank Charles Arif, a French national, was an owner of ICS ‘Le Bridge Corporation Limited’, 
SRL (‘Le Bridge’), a company incorporated in Moldova.4 Le Bridge won a tender organised by 
                                                          
1 Mr Franck Charles Arif v Republic of Moldova, ICSID Case no ARB/11/23, Award (8 April 2013) (Professor 
Bernando Cremades, President; Professor Bernard Hanotiau; Professor Rolf Knieper).   
2 An important question for many areas of human activity, see M van Vugt and W Iredale, ‘Men Behaving Nicely: 
Public Goods as Peacock Tails’ (2013) 104 British J Psychology 104.  
3 This case note is limited to discussion of the merits of the Arif award, but it bears noting that its discussion of 
moral damages, Arif (n 1) paras 584-615, has been relied upon by Antoine Abou Lahoud et Leila Bounafen-Abou Lahoud 
v DRC, ICSID Case no ARB/10/14, Award (7 February 2014) (Professor William Park, President; Karim Hafez; 
Marie-Andrée Ngwe) paras 620, 622; Quiborax SA and Non Metallic Minerals SA v Bolivia, ICSID Case no ARB/06/2, 
Award (16 September 2015) (Professor Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, President; Marc Lalonde; Professor Brigitte 
Stern) para 618.  
4 Arif  (n 1) para 43.  
the Government of Moldova for the creation of a network of duty free stores on the border with 
Romania.5 Le Bridge concluded a contract with the Customs Service,6 executed lease agreements 
with four local customs offices, obtained licenses to operate duty free stores, and was ready to 
open four duty free stores in November 2009.7 Le Bridge also signed a lease agreement with a 
State Enterprise Chisinau International Airport, which was approved by the State Administration 
of Civil Aviation and the Board of Directors of the State Enterprise; license to operate duty free 
stores were updated to include the airport.8  (The distinction between ‘border stores’ and ‘airport 
stores’ was important in resolution of the claim.)  
In December a competitor brought a case against Le Bridge, the Ministry of Economy and 
Commerce, and the National Customs Service before Moldovan courts in relation to border 
stores, seeking to cancel the results of the tender and the four lease agreements with customs 
offices.9 Much judicial to and fro followed in 2009-12. While Moldova’s courts mostly accepted 
the competitor’s arguments and ordered the cancelation of tender and existing contracts, Le 
Bridge was granted the right to open a few new stores, and the Supreme Court eventually 
overturned the unfavourable judgment and sent the case back to lower courts.10 In November 
2009, the same competitor also brought another case against Le Bridge and the Airport State 
Enterprise in relation to airport stores, seeking to cancel the lease agreement.11 Again, after 
numerous judicial decisions in 2009-12, domestic courts accepted these arguments, ordering 
eviction of Le Bridge.12  
Arif claimed that the conduct of Moldova’s authorities and courts had been in breach of a 
number of obligations under the 1997 France-Moldova BIT relating to expropriation, specific 
commitments, fair and equitable treatment, arbitrary and unreasonable measures, discrimination, 
and denial of justice.13  
 
III. MERITS 
 
International law has a robust set of rules for courts not behaving nicely.14 The problem in Arif 
(to use the word ‘problem’ rather loosely) was that Moldovan courts appeared to be behaving 
                                                          
5  Ibid paras 41-3.  
6  Ibid paras 44-8.  
7  Ibid paras 50-1.  
8  Ibid paras 87-92.  
9  Ibid para 59.  
10  Ibid paras 60-86.  
11  Ibid para 93.  
12  Ibid paras 94-124.  
13  Ibid paras 187-224.  
14  J Paulsson, Denial of Justice (CUP 2005).  
nicely. Hence the question: when, if ever, will a State incur responsibility under international 
investment law for decisions of domestic courts in claims brought by private parties in relation 
to investment? The Tribunal considered this issue from the perspective of several primary 
obligations. First, had expropriation taken place? The Tribunal was not persuaded that it had, 
primarily because an investor could not be deprived of rights that were invalid. Contracts had 
been declared invalid by Moldovan courts, which had been applying Moldovan law legitimately 
and in good faith.15 Nor was the investor’s argument improved by being rephrased as relating to 
estoppel. To accept the argument that Moldova was estopped from denying the rights that it had 
itself granted it ‘would inevitably imply that Moldova can be liable at an international level for 
the correct application by the Moldovan courts of Moldovan law in lawsuits filed by a private 
competitor’. 16    
The Tribunal then addressed denial of justice. It first considered whether an investor 
could rely on denial of justice under customary international law. Drawing a distinction between 
customary obligations of denial of justice and obligations under investment protection treaties,17 
it noted ‘firstly, that international law allows a free-standing claim for denial of justice and 
secondly, that such claim can only be successfully pursued by a person that was denied justice 
through court proceedings in which it participated as a party’. Since Le Bridge, rather than Arif, 
had been the party before domestic courts, the claim based on customary law was dismissed.18 At 
the same time, these arguments could be considered as part of a fair and equitable treatment 
claim regarding injury to shareholders’ rights,19 responsibility arising ‘if and when the judiciary 
breached the standard by fundamentally unfair proceedings and outrageously wrong, final and 
binding decisions’.20  
The Tribunal proceeded to consider whether the proceedings regarding airport stores 
had constituted denial of justice. While courts had committed procedural errors, these did not 
‘amount to such a manifest disrespect of due process that they offend a sense of judicial 
propriety’.21 No substantive denial of justice had been committed either – even if the court’s 
reasoning could have been less formalistic, it could be followed throughout.22 The Tribunal then 
considered judicial proceedings regarding the tender and border stores.23 Some aspects of these 
                                                          
15  Ibid paras 415-7. In any event, border stores were still operating and generating considerable revenue, ibid para 
418.  
16  Ibid para 419, see also paras 420-21.  
17  Ibid para 423-34.  
18  Ibid para 435.  
19  Ibid para 436-45.  
20  Ibid para 445.  
21  Ibid para 447.  
22  Ibid para 450-54.  
23  Ibid paras 455-97.  
proceedings did appear to the Tribunal to be problematic or wrong, but the standard of 
international wrongfulness was never reached: ‘courts did not render decisions that no 
competent and honest court would have possibly been able to render’,24 ‘there was [not] a 
general animus against [investor’s] business, and .. the judiciary [had not] tried to destroy [its] 
business in Moldova in general’,25 ‘the error [was not] tainted by impermissible bias and bad 
faith’,26 and ‘procedures [were] not so void of reason that they breathe bad faith’.27  
The Tribunal finally addressed the claim regarding breach of fair and equitable treatment, 
expressed in Article 3 of the BIT as an obligation ‘to ensure …, in accordance with Public 
International Law principles, fair and equitable treatment’. Even though the language of ‘Public 
International Law principles’ could be read as a reference to customary international law, the 
Tribunal considered the issue to be ‘increasingly of historic significance’ because of treaty 
practice accelerating the development of custom, and in any event the particular provision, put in 
its context and by reference to object and purpose, was imposing ‘an autonomous standard’. 28 It 
then elaborated the content of obligation from the perspective of legitimate expectations, 
describing them as expectations with ‘an objective basis, … not fanciful or the result of 
misplaced optimism’,29 with an identifiable scope and origin,30 which are balanced with the State’s 
right to regulate, 31 and may be breached by both substantive changes in policy and treatment of 
the investor during that process.32 By applying this standard, the Tribunal concluded that ‘[t]he 
legitimate expectation of the investor of a secure legal framework to operate a duty free store at 
Chisinau Airport was breached’ because of the inconsistency between the conduct of authorities 
that endorsed and encouraged the investment, and the conduct of courts that found investment 
to be unlawful.33 Conversely, legitimate expectations had not been breached regarding border 
stores because there had been no expectation of exclusivity, and the investor was not precluded 
from operating there.34  
 
IV. COMMENTS 
 
                                                          
24  Ibid para 464.  
25  Ibid para 465.  
26  Ibid para 470.  
27  Ibid para 482.  
28  Ibid para 529.  
29  Ibid para 532.  
30  Ibid para 535.  
31  Ibid para 537.  
32  Ibid para 538.  
33  Ibid para 547.  
34  Ibid para 548-55.  
The Tribunal’s observations in relation to the nature of treaty obligations of fair and equitable 
treatment and modern developments of customary international law are in line with a significant 
amount of arbitral decisions and legal writings. It is fair to say that whatever reservations one 
might have about that position will not be dispelled by the brief reasoning of this award.35 But 
even if one were to accept the position as correct in general terms, its articulation by the Tribunal 
does not easily fit within the framework of sources and interpretation. One might take the view 
that the rule on fair and equitable treatment is ‘autonomous’ (a term tolerably clear in substance, 
signifying the minimal impact of general international law in the interpretative process, even if 
slightly awkward because ‘autonomous interpretation’ has its own and different meaning within 
the law of treaties36). And one might take the view that customary rules on denial of justice 
provide criteria and presumptions of primary obligations of customary law regarding denial of 
justice. But it seems slightly strained for an interpreter to simultaneously exclude custom (by 
necessary implication, also customary rules on denial of justice) and engage in an inquiry under 
the rubric of ‘Denial of Justice under the Fair and Equitable Treatment’, relying on concepts 
taken from a customary law.  
It may be more convenient to approach the issue from the procedural perspective. 
Investment treaty Tribunals, just as international tribunals more broadly, are institutions of 
limited jurisdiction, therefore a Tribunal has to first determine whether claims based on 
customary law would fall within their ratione materiae jurisdiction. Jurisdictional rules in treaty 
claims are not usually read as providing jurisdiction for interpreting and applying other rules of 
international law.37 If customary law-based claims do not directly fall within the jurisdictional 
four corners, the next question (again, as for any other international tribunal), is whether rules 
not within jurisdiction nevertheless play a role for adjudicating upon rules within jurisdiction. For 
example, treaty rules could themselves refer to customary law (as the ‘Public International Law 
principles’ proviso in Article 3 might have done), or custom may be a ‘relevant’ rule that has to 
be taken into account according to principles of treaty interpretation.38 If, by one route or 
another, customary law can be articulated as a relevant part of the interpretative argument, a 
further question, expressed with exceptional clarity by the Tribunal in the Rompetrol v Romania 
award, needs to be considered. Is denial of justice – ‘a legal institution which has as its very 
                                                          
35  M Paparinskis, ‘Introduction to the Paperback Edition’ in The International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable 
Treatment (OUP 2014) xlvi-xlix.  
36  R Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2nd edn, OUP 2015) 30-35.   
37  Although note that the dispute settlement clause in the particular BIT is expressed prima facie broad terms, as 
covering ‘[a]ny disputes relating to investments’, Article 7(1) BIT, and not explicitly limited to disputes regarding the 
BIT.  
38  1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts 31(1), 31(3)(c); Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration 
(Mauritius v UK), Annex VII Arbitration (18 March 2015) paras 293-98; Martins Paparinskis, ‘Come Together or Do 
It My Way: No Systemic Preference’ (2014) 108 ASIL Proceedings 246.  
essence the relationship between a State and aliens’, ‘not a barrier interposed between a State and 
its own citizens’ – applicable to the particular legal relationship considered in the investment 
dispute?39 It is not obvious that it is: by applying Rompetrol to Arif, one would probably conclude 
that, while Moldova had an obligation not to mistreat a French national under customary law on 
treatment of aliens, it did not have such an obligation regarding LeBridge, a company with 
Moldovan nationality.40 Consequently, the simple point that Moldova could not commit a breach 
of customary law on the treatment of aliens by mistreating its national is sufficient to dispose of 
the customary law issue.   
 Another issue, likely to raise readers’ eyebrows, is the Tribunal’s decision on 
wrongfulness. To recall, the Tribunal found Moldova responsible for unobjectionable judgments 
of domestic courts because that had frustrated legitimate expectations of the investor generated 
by the conduct of administrative authorities. The starting point for thinking about the issue 
should be the mainstream reading of the law of denial of justice, influentially explained by Jan 
Paulsson as focusing on procedural denial of justice and requiring a full exhaustion of system of 
justice.41 One challenge to this explanation has been expressed by relying on different treaty 
obligations, alleged to qualify the rigour of either the requirement of full exhaustion (‘effective 
means’) or the procedural focus (expropriation).42 Another challenge distances the treaty 
obligations from criteria of denial of justice set out in customary law.43 There is scope for 
reasonable disagreement about the merits and degree of success of these challenges. Whatever 
reservations one might have in that regard are applicable with particular force to Arif. It is 
distinctly odd to conclude that, as the Tribunal itself noted regarding the investor’s invocation of 
estoppel and expropriation, ‘Moldova can be liable at an international level for the correct 
application by the Moldovan courts of Moldovan law in lawsuits filed by a private competitor’. 
International dispute settlement faces sufficient challenges when disciplining conduct of courts 
that are allegedly engaged in wrongful conduct.44 It is not at all obvious that deepening the 
                                                          
39 Rompetrol Group v Republic of Romania, ICSID Case ARB/06/3, Award (6 May 2013) (Sir Frank Berman, President; 
Donal Donovan; Marc Lalonde) para 165, see also paras 166-67.    
40 It is unclear whether the conditions of Article 11(b) of the 2006 ILC Articles on Diplomatic Protection were 
satisfied in the facts of this case, nor indeed whether this proposition reflects customary law, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo 
(Guinea v DRC) [2007] ICJ Rep para 93. Of course, other regimes of international law, particularly human rights law, 
may impose obligations on States regarding treatment of their nationals.    
41 Paulsson (n 14); Z Douglas, ‘International Responsibility for Domestic Adjudication: Denial of Justice 
Deconstructed’ (2014) 1 ICLQ 867.     
42 M Sattorova, ‘Denial of Justice Disguised? Investment Arbitration and the Protection of Foreign Investors from 
Judicial Misconduct’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 223, 233-43.     
43 Rompetrol (n 7) paras 160, 197.      
44 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v Republic of Ecuador, PCA Case no 2009-23, Fourth Interim Award 
on Interim Measures (7 February 2013) (VV Veeder, President; Dr Horacio A Grigera Naón; Professor Vaughan 
Lowe) paras 77-86.     
responsibility of States for lawful conduct of courts is a development in a systemically desirable 
direction.  
A proposition about international law may, of course, be simultaneously odd, 
systemically undesirable, and accurate, but one would expect the argument in favour of such a 
rule to be particularly persuasive. It is not entirely clear that the Tribunal’s argument satisfies this 
benchmark. The Tribunal starts by noting (in the concluding paragraph of elaboration of fair and 
equitable treatment) that ‘[t]he international responsibility of a State is not determined by the 
legality of an act under domestic law, but by the principle of attribution in international law’.45 
Both of these points are right, but the statement, if taken to be exhaustive, is not. International 
responsibility is determined by attribution of conduct to the State and breach of a primary 
obligation,46 and it is the existence of a primary obligation not to permit ‘correct application by 
the Moldovan courts of Moldovan law in lawsuits’ if it differs from the position taken by other 
organs of the State that the Tribunal has to demonstrate.  
The Tribunal makes a step in that direction, suggesting that inconsistency may be an 
element of fair and equitable treatment with a nod to the MTD v Chile award.47 But an 
unelaborated reference that does not even specify relevant paragraph(s) cannot quite carry the 
day on its own. The language of MTD award regarding ‘inconsistency of action between two 
arms of the same Government vis-à-vis the same investor’ is, admittedly, broad.48 Still, the 
rationale of MTD, where ‘the legal framework of the country provide[d] for a mechanism to 
coordinate’,49 may be unduly strained by applying it to inconsistency of action between arms of 
the government that are set up precisely to be constitutionally autonomous. Indeed, undue 
coordination of executive and judicial conduct may itself give rise to responsibility for denial of 
justice under investment law.50 The nods to attribution do not reinforce the reasoning, and rather 
seem to be attempts to bridge the gap regarding primary rules by relying on secondary rules.51 
That, as the MTD annulment committee noted, is not a done thing: ‘to mix up attribution and 
breach would require explanation and would indicate confusion’.52  
                                                          
45 Arif (n 1) para 539.     
46 2001 ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts Article 2(b); James Crawford, State 
Responsibility: The General Part (CUP 2013) Part III.     
47 Arif (n 1) para 547(b), also para 538.     
48MTD Equity Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile SA v Chile, ICSID Case no ARB/01/7, Award (15 May 2004) para 163.    
49 Ibid.     
50 Flughafen Zürich A.G. y Gestión e Ingeniería IDC S.A. c. Venezuela, ICSID Case no ARB/10/19, Award (18 
November 2014) paras 630-721.       
51 Arif (n 1) para 547(c).     
52 MTD Equity Sdn Bhd and MTD Chile SA v Chile, ICSID Case no ARB/01/7, Decision on Annulment (21 March 
2007) para 89; see also Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v Argentina, ICSID Case no 
ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment (3 July 2002) fn 17.    
These observations should not be read as belittling the complexity of questions that 
reversals by domestic courts of positions held by other public authorities or courts themselves 
may create for investment law.53 The modest point made here is that the far-reaching 
implications of the Arif award do not appear to be matched by reasoning that will persuade 
everybody. Future Tribunals faced with similar challenges may be better served by treating the 
authority of these particular passages with a light touch.  
                                                          
53 Vaughan Lowe, Regulation or Expropriation (2002) 55 Current Legal Problems 447, 448, 458, 465.   
